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Abstract—Transaction-level modeling (TLM) has become the de-facto reference modeling style for system-level design and verification
of embedded systems. It allows designers to implement high-level communication protocols for simulations up to 1000x faster than
at register-transfer level (RTL). To guarantee interoperability between TLM IP suppliers and users, designers implement the TLM
communication protocols by relying on a reference standard, such as the standard OSCI for SystemC TLM. Functional correctness of
such protocols as well as their compliance to the reference TLM standard are usually verified through user-defined testbenches, which
high-quality and completeness play a key role for an efficient TLM design and verification flow. This article presents a methodology
to apply mutation analysis, a technique applied in literature for SW testing, for measuring the testbench quality in verifying TLM
protocols. In particular, the methodology aims at (i) qualifying the testbenches by considering both the TLM protocol correctness and
their compliance to a defined standard (i.e., OSCI TLM), (ii) optimizing the simulation time during mutation analysis by avoiding mutation
redundancies, and (iii) driving the designers in the testbench improvement. Experimental results on benchmarks of different complexity
and architectural characteristics are reported to analyze the methodology applicability.
F
Index Terms—Transaction-level modeling, Functional qualification, Mu-
tation analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
Transaction-level modeling (TLM) is nowadays the ref-
erence modeling style for embedded system design and
verification at system-level [1]. It greatly speeds up the
design process by allowing designers to model and
verify the system at different abstraction levels [2], [3].
The Open SystemC Initiative (OSCI) [4] committee has
been developing a reference standard for TLM in the last
years for guaranteeing the maximum interoperability
between suppliers and users, thus encouraging the use
of virtual platforms for fast simulation prior to the avail-
ability of the RTL code. TLM-2.0 has eventually become
the de-facto reference standard for SystemC TLM [5].
The OSCI TLM standard provides a library of prim-
itives for implementing standard interfaces, such as
blocking, non-blocking, direct memory interface, etc..
Such interfaces are adopted for implementing different
standard protocols (e.g., loosely-time, approximately-
time, etc.) each one having more or less details according
to the target use case (i.e., SW development, HW verifi-
cation, architectural analysis, etc.) [5].
Correctness of such protocol implementations and
their compliance with the OSCI standard are dynami-
cally verified through TLM testbenches, which are also
implemented by designers. As a consequence, issues
like measure of quality of such testbenches as well as
testbench improvement are fundamental for an efficient
verification flow.
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On the other hand, mutation analysis and mutation
testing have definitely gained consensus during the last
decades as being important techniques for software test-
ing [6]. Mutation analysis is presented as an approach to
validate the effectiveness of a test suite with respect to
its ability in discovering errors in software programs [7],
while mutation testing is the process of generating new
test suites to improve the mutation analysis score [8].
The testing approaches rely on the creation of several
versions of the program to be tested, mutated by intro-
ducing syntactic changes. The purpose of such mutations
consists of perturbing the program behavior to see if the
test suite is able to detect the difference between the orig-
inal program and the mutated versions. The effectiveness
of the test suite is then measured by computing the
percentage of detected mutations. Similar concepts are
applied also for HW testing, when verification engineers
use high-level fault simulation to measure the quality of
test benches [9], and test pattern generation to improve
fault coverage, thus, providing more effective test suites
for the design under verification (DUV) [9].
Mutation analysis has never been applied for mea-
suring how good and reliable are testbenches to verify
SystemC TLM protocols, by also considering the protocol
compliance to a defined standard. What is missing is:
• a reference model for representing the standard
communication protocols, to capture the design er-
rors related to the protocol;
• a model for representing design errors through mu-
tants, strictly related to the communication protocol
rather than the design functionality;
• a technique to inject mutants in code statements
related to the protocol implementation rather than
injecting mutants throughout the code.
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Fig. 1. Methodology overview
a TLM protocol compliant to the standard in different
ways. In fact, OSCI provides a library of primitives for
different standard interfaces and a set of specifications
that define the standard TLM protocols (see upper left
side of Fig. 1). By using the library and following the
protocol specifications, designers implement their own
OSCI compliant protocol (e.g., loosely-timed, 4-phase
approximately-timed, etc.). Thus, the mutation analysis
should give a quality measure of the testbench (i.e.,
testbench qualification) to verify the protocol correctness
and compliance independently from their specific im-
plementations.
In this context, this article proposes a methodology
to apply mutation analysis for testbench qualification by
considering the OSCI TLM-2.0 as the reference standard.
The methodology, whose overview is shown in Fig. 1,
consists of the following steps:
1) Modeling of the TLM standard primitives and the
TLM protocols through the extended finite state
machine (EFSM) formal model [10].
2) Definition of a fault model for EFSM and identifi-
cation of faults into the EFSMs of TLM protocols.
The proposed EFSM fault model is based on an
extension of the well-known transition fault model
for FSMs [11];
3) Identification of a set of classes of design errors that
designers may commit during the TLM protocol
implementation.
4) Implementation of a library of mutants, which are
a mutated version of the standard TLM primi-
tives and that are defined for implementing the
EFSM faults. A correlation between design errors
and EFSM faults is identified to define the minimal
set of mutants that implements all possible design
errors, in order to optimize the simulation phase of
the mutation testing.
5) An automatic injection technique for injecting the
mutants into the user design. The mutant injection
is performed by replacing the TLM standard prim-
itives instantiated and completed by the user with
the mutants provided by the TLM mutant library.
It is important to note that, given a library of prim-
itives and the specification of a reference protocol, the
library of mutants is generated once for all and applies
to the mutation analysis of all the SystemC TLM designs
implemented with those primitives.
Moreover, the correlation between design errors and
EFSM faults, and the corresponding generated mutants
allow designers to exploit information on not-killed mu-
tants for improving the testbench.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the related work. Section 3 introduces the
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background for the proposed methodology, including
the TLM-2.0 standard, the notion of mutation analysis,
and the EFSM model. The methodology is presented in
Sections 3-7. Section 4 presents how TLM interfaces and
protocols are represented by EFSMs. Section 5 presents
the EFSM fault model for TLM protocols. Section 6
presents the classes of identified design errors. Section 7
shows how the minimal set of mutants is identified for
implementing the TLM mutant library. Section 8 presents
the technique for automatically injecting mutants into
the user TLM design by adopting the TLM mutant
library. Section 9 shows the experimental results. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 10.
2 RELATED WORK
Mutation analysis has been actively researched for over
30 years in the SW testing community and it has been
applied to many different programming languages (e.g.,
Fortran, C, Java, C#, SQL) [8], [12]–[14]. In particular,
several approaches [15], [16], empirical studies [17] and
frameworks [18] have been presented in the literature
for mutation analysis. Different aspects concerning soft-
ware implementation are analyzed in all these works,
in which the approaches are mainly suited for Java or
C constructs. However, all these approaches target ba-
sic constructs and low-level synchronization primitives
rather than high-level constructs and primitives typically
used for modeling SystemC TLM designs.
Only in recent years mutation analysis has been ap-
plied to languages for system-level design and veri-
fication such as SystemC [19]–[25]. [19], [20] propose
mutation models for perturbing SystemC TLM descrip-
tions. In particular, these works present different analysis
of the main constructs provided by the first drafts of
the TLM standard and a set of mutants to perturb the
primitives related to the TLM communication interfaces.
[21] proposes a fault model by developing mutation
operators for concurrent SystemC designs. In particular
it aims at verifying SystemC descriptions by facing non-
determinism and concurrency problems such as starva-
tion, interference and deadlock typical of such language.
[22] introduces the concept of functional qualification
for measuring the quality of functional verification of
TLM models. In particular, it presents the results ob-
tained by combining the mutation model of [19] with
the testcases and assertions of an industrial functional
verification framework.
[23] proposes to attack the verification quality prob-
lem for concurrent SystemC programs by developing
mutation testing based coverage metrics. The approach
involves a comprehensive set of mutation operators for
concurrency constructs in SystemC and defines a con-
current coverage metric considering multiple execution
schedules that a concurrent program can generate.
[24] introduces an automatic fault localization ap-
proach for TLM designs based on bounded model check-
ing. Faults and possible fixes are first formalized in a
fault model. Then simulation is used to produce an error
trace showing the violation of the specification. Given
this trace, bounded model checking is used to determine
diagnoses among the possible diagnosis candidates.
[25] presents SCEMIT, a tool for the automated in-
jection of errors into C/C++/ SystemC models. A selec-
tion of mutation style errors is supported, and injection
is performed though a plugin interface in the GCC
compiler, which minimizes the impact of the proposed
tool on existing simulation flows. The results show the
value of high-level error injection as a coverage measure
compared to conventional code coverage measures.
This article is based and extends the works presented
in [19], [20]. Compared to [19], this article presents a new
mutation model, which applies to the TLM primitives,
interfaces and communication protocols of the final TLM
2.0 standard OSCI (which is structurally and seman-
tically different from the first draft discussed in [19]).
In particular, the new mutation model deals with the
new protocols (i.e., approximately timed, loosely timed,
etc.) and the new primitive semantics introduced by the
TLM standard. Compared to [20], this article extends the
analysis of the mutation model and its application from
the single primitives to complete TLM protocols.
Finally, compared to all previous works, this article
presents a comprehensive methodology for generating
a library of mutants and the technique for automati-
cally inject the mutants into the user TLM design. The
methodology aims at (i) generating the minimal set of
mutants for reducing redundancy during the mutation
analysis, and (ii) improving the feedback readability
of the mutation analysis to locate the detected design
errors in the user design. To do that, the work presents
an analysis of correlation between design errors, EFSM
faults, and mutants.
3 BACKGROUND
This section introduces the key concepts of TLM and
mutation analysis. Then it presents the formal model
whereby TLM communication protocols are represented.
3.1 TLM: use cases, interfaces, primitives, and pro-
tocols
The OSCI committee explicitly recognizes the existence
of a variety of use cases in TLM, such as SW develop-
ment, SW performance analysis, architectural analysis,
and HW verification. However, rather than defining
an abstraction level around each use case, the TLM-
2.0 standard defines a set of interfaces (i.e., blocking,
non-blocking, direct memory, and debug interfaces) and
provides a library of primitives (i.e., b_transport(),
nb_transport(), etc.) for implementing the commu-
nication side of transaction-level models. Then, the stan-
dard specifies a number of protocols that are appropriate
for, but not locked to, the various use cases.
The different TLM protocols allow designers to de-
scribe and simulate a design with different levels of
detail. The best-suited protocol is selected depending
on the target use case and each protocol is imple-
mented by using specific TLM primitives (as explained
4
Source code Mutant #1 Mutant #2 Mutant #3
if(a && b) if(a || b) if(a && b) if(a && b)
c = 1; c = 1; c = 2; c = 1;
else else else else
c = 0; c = 0; c = 0; c = 0;
TABLE 1
Examples of mutation operator
in Section 4.1). The most adopted TLM-2.0 protocols are
loosely-timed and approximately-timed:
Loosely-timed (LT) is appropriate for software develop-
ment, by using, for example, a virtual platform model
of an MPSoC, where the software may include one or
more operating systems. Models implemented with this
protocol have a loose dependency between timing and
data. They do not depend on the advancement of time
to be able to produce a response and, normally, resource
contention and arbitration are not considered.
Approximately-timed (AT) is appropriate for architec-
tural exploration and performance analysis. Models im-
plemented with this protocol have a much stronger
dependency between timing and data. Since these mod-
els must synchronize the transactions before processing
them, they are forced to trigger multiple context switches
in the simulation, eventually resulting in performance
penalties. On the other hand, they easily model resource
contention and arbitration.
Loosely-timed and approximately-timed are two ex-
amples of protocols proposed by OSCI but, in princi-
ple, users can extend the set of protocols by defining
their own reference protocols. However, the proposed
methodology and mutation model are independent from
any reference protocol. For the sake of clarity, the article
refers to the standard OSCI protocols as they are the
most widespread in the SystemC community.
3.2 Mutation analysis
Mutation analysis relies on the concept of creating sev-
eral models of the design under verification (e.g., a SW
program), each one mutated by introducing a syntacti-
cally correct functional change (mutant). The purpose
of such mutations consists of perturbing the behavior
of the model and to verify whether the test suite is
able to detect the difference between the original model
and the mutated versions [26]. A transformation rule
that generates a mutant from the original program is
called a mutation operator. Table 1 shows the generation
of three mutants of a C++ code fragment, which replace
and operator (&&) with or operator (||) and change two
assignment statement. Others operators could be consid-
ered as well. Typical mutation operators are designed
to modify variables, expressions and assignments by
replacement, insertion or deletion operators.
Once a mutant has been generated, a test set is sup-
plied to the system. The outputs of the model without
the mutation are compared with those of the model with
the mutation. If a difference can be observed on such
outputs then the mutant is considered killed, otherwise
it is said to be survived [27].
After all test sets have been executed, a few mutants
may be still survived. Verification engineers can thus
provide additional test inputs to kill such survived mu-
tants and, thus, improving the test set quality.
If a mutant cannot be killed by any possible sequence
of inputs, such mutant is said to be equivalent. A model
that has equivalent mutants is syntactically different but
functionally equivalent to the model with no mutants.
Automatically detecting equivalent mutants is impossi-
ble as such a model equivalence is undecidable [28].
Mutation analysis provides designers with an ade-
quacy score, known as mutation score, which indicates
the quality of the input test set. The mutation score is
the ratio of the number of killed mutants over the total
number of non-equivalent mutants. The goal of mutation
analysis is to measure how far mutation score is from
100%, which indicates that the test set is sufficient to
detect all the design errors represented by the mutants.
This work proposes to apply mutation analysis to TLM
SystemC model of communication protocols.
3.3 The EFSM model
An EFSM [29] is a transition system which allows a
more compact and intuitive representation of the state
space with respect to the traditional finite state ma-
chines (FSMs). The EFSM model is widely used for
modeling complex systems like reactive systems [30],
communication protocols [31], buses [32] and controllers
driving data-path [33]. EFSM has been adopted in this
work to easily represent communication protocols based
on transactions as well as mutations on TLM code, as
explained in Section 4. Among different alternatives, the
EFSM formal model has been chosen also because it
captures the main characteristics of the state-oriented,
activity oriented and structure-oriented models [34].
Definition 1: An EFSM is defined as a 5-tuple M =
⟨S, I,O,D, T ⟩ where: S is a set of states, I is a set of
input symbols, O is a set of output symbols, D is a n-
dimensional linear space D1 × . . .×Dn, T is a transition
relation such that T : S×D× I → S×D× O. A generic
point in D is described by a n-tuple x = (x1, ..., xn); it
models the values of the registers internal to the design.
A pair ⟨s, x⟩ ∈ S×D is called configuration of M , while
an operation on an EFSM M = ⟨S, I,O,D, T ⟩ is defined
as follows:
Definition 2: If M is in a configuration ⟨s, x⟩ and it
receives an input i ∈ I , it moves to the configuration
⟨t, y⟩ iff ((s, x, i), (t, y, o)) ∈ T for o ∈ O.
In an EFSM, each transition is associated with a couple
of functions (i.e., an enabling function and an update
function) acting on input, output and register data. The
enabling function expresses a set of conditions on data,
while the update function consists of a set of statements
performing operations on data.
Definition 3: Given an EFSM M = ⟨S, I,O,D, T ⟩,
s ∈ S, t ∈ T, i ∈ I, o ∈ O and the sets X =
{x|((s, x, i), (t, y, o)) ∈ T for y ∈ D} and Y =
{y|((s, x, i), (t, y, o)) ∈ T for x ∈ X}, the enabling and
update functions are defined respectively as:
e(x, i) =
{
















reset=0 and reg!=1 
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out2<=reg*2; 





Fig. 2. Example of EFSM
u(x, i) =
 (y, o) if e(x, i) = 1 and((s, x, i), (t, y, o)) ∈ T ;
undef. otherwise.
Fig. 2 gives an example of the state transition graph
(STG) of an EFSM. A transition is fired if all conditions in
the enabling function are satisfied, bringing the machine
from the current to the destination state and performing
the operations included in the update function.
4 EFSM MODELS OF TLM INTERFACES AND
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
Representing TLM standard primitives and communi-
cation protocols with the EFSM model allows us (i) to
focus on what can be altered in the code and (ii) to
identify similarities that can be shared. More specif-
ically, the use of EFSM models shifts the focus to-
wards specific aspects of the communication protocol
(e.g., payload fields, communication phases, etc.) that a
generic model may ignore. Representing communication
primitives with EFSM models enables the identification
of design errors that can be implemented in the same
way, i.e., by the same mutant. Hence, going through an
EFSM representation before injecting mutants leads to a
reduction of the number of mutants with respect to the
number of possible design errors. Section 7.2 deals with
this point more in detail.
The following sections summarize the features of the
main SystemC TLM 2.0 primitives and protocols, and
propose their formalization by means of EFSMs
4.1 EFSM models of TLM primitives
TLM communication between an initiator and a target
module relies on the exchange of packets containing data
and control values, through a communication channel.
The TLM library provides users with standard packets
(TLM payload) which are passed as a primitive parameter
through standard channels (e.g., a TLM socket).
Each TLM interface has a proper primitive (or set
of primitives), packet and communication channel. The
EFSM models of the TLM primitives are grouped into
four main categories, corresponding to the standard
interfaces: blocking, non-blocking, direct memory, and
debug interfaces.
4.1.1 Blocking interface
The blocking interface provides a simplified communi-
cation mechanism, suited for models which complete a
transaction in a single primitive call. The TLM standard
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time to be sent back; 
nb_transport_bw(payload, phase, time); 
Handling received data; 
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Creating DMI descriptor; 
get_direct_mem_ptr(payload, descriptor); 
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A Setting payload to be sent; 
transport_dbg(payload); 




Setting data to be sent: 
payload, phase, and time; 
nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time); 
Handling received data; 
[true | resp_event] 
Fig. 3. EFSM models of the communication primitives for
blocking (a), non-blocking (b, c), DMI (d, e), and debug (f)
interfaces
primitive is b_transport() and the corresponding
EFSM model is shown in Figure 3(a). The EFSM model
consists of three states (A,B,C) and two transitions. The
initiator starts a transaction by firstly setting the payload
and the local time to send to the target and, then, calling
the primitive (transition A → B). The enabling function
is set to true as there are no explicit conditions on any
event for starting a transaction in the TLM blocking
interface (see Section 4.2).
The EFSM is blocked in the intermediate state B
waiting for an event from the channel (socket event). State
B represents the time in which the primitive body is
executed, that is, the time in which the target executes
the required functionality and sets the results into the re-
turning payload. When the primitive returns, the socket
event is triggered and the EFSM moves to the final state
C, that is, the initiator can retrieve the payload and
handle the returning data held in it.
4.1.2 Non-blocking interface
With the non-blocking interface mechanism, a transac-
tion is decomposed into phases, aiming to implement
a more accurate and detailed communication protocols.
Such phases, as well as payload and timing informa-
tion, are passed as parameters through the primitives
nb_transport_fw() and nb_transport_bw(). The
primitive nb_transport_fw() is called by the initia-
tor and implemented by the target, while vice-versa
for the nb transport bw(). Aside from their name, the
two primitives have similar semantics and are called in
combined way for implementing detailed protocols, such
as the approximately-timed one. The EFSM models of
the two non-blocking primitives consist of two states A
and B (see Figures 3.b, c.) as they perform the requested
operation as soon as they are called and return to the
caller who can handle immediately the received data.
Depending on the communication protocol, the enabling
function can be always true or an explicit condition on

























Fig. 4. EFSM model of the loosely-timed protocol
4.1.3 Direct memory interface (DMI)
DMI is used by an initiator for directly accessing to
a specified area of the target memory. It relies on the
use of a direct pointer to the memory area, without
having to resort to the transport interface. DMI guar-
antees an increment in simulation speed, as it skips
the interconnect components located between the ini-
tiator and the target, thus speeding up simulation for
the transactions that operate on memory in a loosely-
timed model. The EFSMs of the non-blocking primitives
for modeling DMIs (i.e., get_direct_mem_ptr() and
invalidate_direct_mem_ptr()) are shown in Fig-
ures 3.d, e.
4.1.4 Debug interface
Debug interface aims at allowing designers to debug
the communication protocol. Such a kind of interface
allows the initiator to directly access a target memory
disregarding delays information, temporization, event
notifications or side effects that may occur in a transac-
tion. It exploits the same channel used by the transport
interfaces, but the access to the target is immediate. The
EFSM model of the non-blocking debug primitive (i.e.,
transport_dbg()) is shown in Figures 3.f.
Hereafter, the article will focus on the loosely-timed
and approximately timed TLM protocols for the sake
of clarity, even if the methodology applies to any other
TLM protocol.
4.2 EFSM of TLM-2.0 communication protocols
Loosely-timed and approximately-timed TLM protocols
are implemented with the blocking and non-blocking
primitives, respectively.
Figure 4 depicts the EFSM model of the loosely-
timed communication protocol, in which the initiator
and target behaviors have been divided into the elabo-
ration (i.e., functional computation) and communication
phases. The sequence of steps can be summarized as
follows:
1) The initiator moves from an elaboration to a com-
munication phase as soon as it starts a transaction,
in which, (i) it sets the data to send to the target
(i.e., payload and time), (ii) it calls the blocking
primitive through the socket, and (iii) it waits for
an event from the socket (see Section 4.1).
2) The primitive body is implemented into the com-
munication side of the target and is executed in







Setting resulting data to besent back:payload (p);time(t);phase ← BEGIN_RESP;nb_transport_bw(p,phase,t);
-Elaboration phase--Communication phase-Setting data to be sent:payload (p);time (t);phase ← BEGIN_REQ;nb_transport_fw(p,phase,t);Handling received data; Setting data to be sent:time (t)phase ← END_REQ;nb_transport_bw(p,phase,t);Handling received data;
-Communication phase-
nb_transport_fw(p, phase, t) {-) receiving payload;-) time handling;-) notifying req_event-) return status;}nb_transport_bw() {-) time handling;-) return status;}






CD Handling received data;-Elaboration phase-
phase ← END_RESP;nb_transport_fw(-,phase,-);Handling received data; -Elaboration phase-
nb_transport_fw(-, phase, -) {-) time handling;-) return status;}socketresp_event
Fig. 5. EFSM model of the 4-phases AT protocol
primitive body typically consists of (i) receiving the
payload through the pointer passed as parameter,
(ii) taking care of the time information for tem-
porization, (iii) executing the target functionality,
and (iv) modifying some payload fields to send the
resulting data back to the initiator.
3) According to the behavior of the blocking prim-
itives, a socket event is notified to the initiator
as soon as the primitive returns, after which the
initiator can receive the resulting data and conclude
the transaction.
The EFSM model of the 4-phases approximately-timed
protocol is depicted in Figure 5. The transaction is com-
posed of four phases: begin request, end request, begin re-
sponse, end response. Each phase involves a primitive call.
The sequence of steps can be summarized as follows:
1) The initiator starts the transaction in A by setting
payload, time, and initializing the first protocol
phase to begin request (transition A → B). Then it
calls nb transport fw() through the socket.
2) The target executes the primitive body by receiving
the payload, handling the time, notifying a request
event and returning a resulting status back to the
initiator.
3) The initiator handles the received data and con-
cludes the first communication phase in state B.
Then it moves to the intermediate elaboration
phase. In the meanwhile, the target process (waken
up by the request event) carries on the second
phase, end request, (transition A → B) by calling
nb_transport_bw() through the socket.
4) The initiator executes the primitive by handling the
received time information and returning a status to
the target.
5) The target handles the received data and concludes
the second communication phase in state B. Then
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it moves to the intermediate elaboration phase.
6) The target moves to a new communication phase,
by starting the third phase, begin response (C → D).
It sets the payload fields to answer the starting
request by the initiator, the time information, and
calls again the non-blocking primitive along the
backward path.
7) The initiator executes the primitive body, notifies
the response event and returns its outcome to the
target.
8) The target handles the received data and concludes
the third communication phase in state D. Then it
moves to a new elaboration phase. In the mean-
while, the initiator process (waked up by the re-
sponse event) carries on the fourth and last phase,
end response (C → D) by calling the primitive
nb_transport_fw() through the socket.
9) The target executes the primitive by handling the
received time information and returning a status to
the initiator.
10) The initiator handles the received data and con-
cludes the fourth communication phase in state D.
Then it moves to a new elaboration phase.
The non-blocking interface is explicitly intended to
support pipelined transactions and to model communi-
cation with a high degree of timing accuracy. Many other
TLM communication protocols can be created by using
the TLM interfaces previously described, and their EFSM
models can be represented by sequentially composing
the EFSMs of the involved primitives. The proposed
methodology is independent from any specific protocol,
and can be applied to any other TLM protocol in a
similar way as shown for the chosen examples.
5 EFSM FAULT MODEL FOR TLM PROTOCOLS
According to the classification of errors that may affect
FSM proposed in [35], different fault models have been
defined for perturbing FSMs [11], [36]. They generally
target Boolean functions labeling the transitions and/or
destination states of transitions. In this work, an EFSM is
perturbed in a similar way by changing the destination
state of transitions and/or modifying the behavior of
enabling and update functions.
Hereafter, the section shows how the EFSMs of Fig-
ure 3 are perturbed to generate mutated versions of
the TLM primitives. The analysis focuses on the EFSM
faults of primitives b_transport() (Figures 6) and
nb_transport_fw() (Figure 7). The EFSM of the oth-
ers primitives are similarly perturbed.
The EFSM faults are classified as follows:
• Faults on destination states. This class includes the
faults that change the destination state of a tran-
sition. Examples are shown in Figure 6(a, b, c, d)
for primitive b_transport() and Figure 7(a, b, c)
for primitive nb_transport_fw().
• Faults on enabling function. Faults of this class change
the value of the enabling function associated to a
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Fig. 6. Faults on the b_transport() EFSM model
and Figure 7(d, e) in which the enabling function
value is switched to false or true for preventing or
forcing the transition to fire.
• Faults on update function. All the faults that make
changes to the code in the update functions belong
to this class. In particular, they can be divided into
three sub-classes:
– Faults on the code before the primitive call. They
involve the implementation code for setting the
data to be sent (i.e., payload, time, and phase)
(Figure 6(h) and Figure 7(f)).
– Faults in the primitive call. They involve the
primitive parameters and the whole code that
implements the primitive (Figure 6(i) and Fig-
ure 7(g)).
– Faults on the code after the primitive call. They
involve the implementation code for handling
the received data (Figure 6(j) and Figure 7(h)).
The numbers reported in the bottom-right part of each
EFSM identify the design error classes defined in Section
6 that can be put in correspondence to the EFSM faults,
as described in Section 7.1.
The proposed fault model is an extension of the well-
known transition fault model [11], applied to generic
descriptions. Given the complexity and the flexibility
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AB (a)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event] AB (b)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]
AB (d)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]fal e
A Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]true A Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]…
AB (c)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]C
#2 #6
#1#1
B (e) B (f)AB (h)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]…AB (g)
Setting data to be sent:payload, phase, and time;nb_transport_fw(payload, phase, time);Handling received data;[true | resp_event]…
#3  #5
#5#2 #4  #5
#1
Fig. 7. Faults on the nb_transport_fw() EFSM model
required for this purpose, EFSMs are better suited than
traditional FSMs, since they allow for more expressive
power. In this context, it is possible to extract a subset of
transition faults which can be mapped to a correspond-
ing design error, by tracking each transformation taking
place within the EFSM, one by one. To the best of our
knowledge, without the use of the EFSM model it would
not be feasible to identify a set of mutants corresponding
to any possible design error.
6 IDENTIFICATION OF DESIGN ERRORS
Six classes of typical TLM design errors have been
identified, by relying on the expertise we have acquired
by working with designers of TLM platforms in different
European projects [37], [38], by working with designers
of TLM industrial platforms [39], and analyzing several
TLM designs of literature [40]–[42] 1:
1) Deadlock in the communication phase. This class in-
cludes all the design errors due to the wrong
use of primitive wait(). These errors leave the
system in a deadlock state, in which one or more
processes are left indefinitely waiting for an event
which may be triggered only by a process belong-
ing to the same set. Considering the EFSM model
of b_transport() in Figure 3(a), a deadlock is
represented by the transition A → B (or B → C)
not being fired, and by A (or B) becoming the final
state. Similarly, a deadlock in the EFSM model of
the non-blocking primitives in Figure 3(b) and (c)
1. Although to the best of our knowledge the six classes cover all
design errors, any further design error can be added to the list without
altering the methodology.
is represented by the transition A → B not being
fired, and by state A becoming the final state.
2) Misapplication of primitive calls. It includes errors
on the primitive calls as well as the setting of the
primitive parameters. Omitting a b_transport()
call when expected is an example, as well as miss-
ing a nb_transport_bw() call for advancing to
the next transaction phase before initiating a new
transaction, and, finally, setting a wrong phase to a
multi-phase protocol (e.g., in a AT-based protocol).
These errors can be represented by changing the
destination state of the incoming transition from
A to C, or by altering the update function of
the transition A → B in the EFSM model of the
b_transport() primitive. Similarly, the destina-
tion state of the incoming transition can be changed
from A to B, or the update function of the transi-
tion A → B can be modified to represent these
errors in the EFSM models of the non-blocking
primitives.
3) Misapplication of TLM operations. Using a wrong
command with respect to the operation to be
accomplished (e.g., setting a write command for
reading data instead of read) leads to errors be-
longing to this class. The use of a wrong com-
mand is represented in the EFSM models of the
primitives by a change in the update function of
transition A → B. The command field in the
payload is set to TLM_WRITE_COMMAND instead of
TLM_READ_COMMAND, or viceversa.
4) Misapplication of blocking/non-blocking primitives.
Usually a wrong combination of the blocking and
non-blocking interfaces is responsible for this error
class. This wrong combination can be represented
in the EFSM model of the blocking primitive by
changing the enabling function of the transition
B → C to be always true, or by changing the
update function of the transition A → B. The
same effect can be achieved for the non-blocking
primitives by editing the update function of the
transition A → B.
5) Erroneous handling of the generic payload. This class
covers all the errors related to a misuse of the
payload object, including write and read operations
on the payload fields. These errors are represented
by changes in the payload object, which is set
and sent in the update function of the transition
A → B in the EFSM models of the blocking and
non-blocking primitives.
6) Erroneous polling mechanism. Errors caused by a mis-
use of polling belong to this class. They typically
lead to an infinite loop during simulation. This loop
can be represented by changing the destination
state of transition B → C to B (or of transition
A → B to A) for the blocking transport primitive,
and the destination state of transition A → B to
A for the non-blocking transport primitives, thus
modeling an infinite loop.
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Each of the previous error classes has been associated
with at least one fault on the EFSM models of the
TLM protocols, as described in Section 7.1. It is worth
noting that errors leading to problems during the code
compilation are not considered in this work, according
to the theory of the mutation analysis.
7 TLM MUTANT LIBRARY
The mutant library consists of a set of TLM primitives,
which are mutated versions of the standard TLM primi-
tives and that are defined for implementing the EFSM
faults. A correlation between design errors and EFSM
faults is identified to define the minimal set of such
TLM mutants in order to avoid redundant mutants and
optimize the simulation phase of the mutation testing.
7.1 Design errors vs. EFSM faults
The design errors described in Section 6 can be put in
correspondence with the EFSM faults defined in Sec-
tion 5. In particular: (i) each EFSM fault allows us to
represent at least one class of design errors, and (ii)
each design error can be represented by one (and only
one) EFSM fault. Such relationship analysis is reported in
the following only for primitives b_transport() and
nb_transport_fw(), but the same analysis approach
applies to all other primitives.
7.1.1 Primitive b_transport()
Faults on destination states of the EFSM allow us to
represent classes #2, #4, and #6 of design errors. In
particular:
- Fault of Fig. 6(a) makes the transition incoming to
state A to be deviated to state C. As a consequence,
transitions A → B and B → C are skipped. It
models an omission of the primitive call by the
designer (class #2).
- Fault of Fig. 6(b) makes the transition outcoming
from state A to be closed in an infinite loop. It
models a misuse of polling combined with the erro-
neous use of the non-blocking instead of blocking
primitive (classes #4 and #6) (i.e., the primitive
is called in an infinite loop and returns without
waiting for any socket event).
- Fault of Fig. 6(c) models an erroneous use of the
non-blocking instead of blocking primitive (class
#4).
- Fault of Fig. 6(d) models a misuse of polling (class
#6).
Concerning faults on the enabling functions:
- Fault of Fig. 6(e) makes the enabling function of
transition A → B to be stuck at true. The transition is
prevented from being fired and the machine actually
gets stuck in the same state. It models a deadlock
in the communication protocol, i.e., the fact that the
primitive is never called by the initiator (class #1).
- Fault of Fig. 6(f) makes the enabling function of
transition B → C to be stuck at true. The transition is
fired, without waiting for any socket event. It mod-
els an erroneous use of the non-blocking instead of
blocking primitive (class #4).
- Fault of Fig. 6(g) makes the enabling function of
transition B → C to be stuck at false. The transition
is prevented from being fired and the machine
actually gets stuck in the same state. It models a
deadlock in the communication protocol (class #1),
but in this case, the deadlock is caused by a design
error in the target implementation.
Considering faults on update functions:
- Fault of Fig. 6(h) models design errors in the ini-
tiator code before the primitive call, that is, wrong
setting of the payload field (classes #3 and #5).
- Fault of Fig. 6(i) models general design errors in call-
ing the primitive or setting the primitive parameters
(classes #2, #4, and #5).
- Fault of Fig. 6(j) models design errors in the initiator
code after the primitive call, that is, wrong handling
of the received data (class #5)
7.1.2 Primitive nb_transport_fw()
The non-blocking behavior of the primitive often leads
to some different matchings between EFSM faults and
classes of design errors w.r.t. the blocking primitive. In
particular:
- Fault of Fig. 7(a) models an omission of the primi-
tive call by the designer (class #2), as for the block-
ing primitive.
- Fault of Fig. 7(b) makes the primitive to be called in
an infinite loop, modeling a misuse of polling (class
#6).
- Fault of Fig. 7(c) makes the transition outgoing
from state A to go into a new intermediate state C,
from which the EFSM never comes out and, thus,
never reaches the state B. This allow us to model a
deadlock in the communication protocol (class #1)
and, in particular, the fact that the non-blocking
primitive is called but never returns to the caller
(i.e., the deadlock is caused by a design error in the
target implementation).
Considering faults on enabling functions:
- Fault of Fig. 7(d), similarly to the corresponding
blocking version, prevents the transition from being
fired and the machine actually gets stuck in state A.
It models a deadlock in the communication protocol
(class #1) caused by an implementation error in the
initiator code.
- Fault of Fig. 7(e) makes the enabling function of
transition A → B to be stuck at true. As a conse-
quence, the EFSM misses any synchronization event
(e.g., the response event of Figure 5), leading to a
possible deadlock (class #1).
Finally, faults on update functions (Figure 7(f, g, h))
allow us to represent the same classes of design errors
as in the case of blocking primitive.
On the other hand, it is possible to represent each
design error by at least one EFSM fault. Each error may
be committed in the initiator, in the target, or in both
of them. For example, the error of forgetting to call
the primitive will be certainly located in the initiator,
while the error of wrongly setting the response status of
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the payload will be located in the target. Errors related
to a deadlock may be located into both the initiator
and the target, as the wait statement that leads to the
deadlock may be used in any module involved in the
communication protocol.
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 report in detail the list of
all possible design errors that may be located in the
initiator and in the target, for primitives b transport() and
nb transport fw(), respectively. Column Class reports the
class to which the design error belongs, while columns
EFSM fault and Cat. report the EFSM fault that represents
such design error and the corresponding category. The
categories are indicated with the following abbreviations
(see Section 5): DS: destination states; EF: enabling func-
tion; UFB: update function - before the primitive call;
UFI: update function - in the primitive call; UFA: update
function - after the primitive call.
A set of design errors with the same description (e.g.,
7-13 in Table 2) represent all possible wrong combina-
tions a designer may commit in setting an attribute (i.e.,
enumerable value) of a payload field. In the example,
errors from 7 to 13 cover the seven possible attributes of
the response status field of the payload.
The next Section shows how the correlation between
design errors and EFSM faults identified so far is ex-
ploited to implement the minimal set of mutants. It is
important to note that in case a new design error was
identified, the same approach applies to identify the
correlation between such a new error and an EFSM fault.
The identified correlation is then exploited to map the
new design error to an already existing mutant or to
implement a new mutant from scratch.
7.2 Identification of the minimal set of TLM mutants
The correlations identified in the previous section can
be grouped into three categories, each one involving the
implementation of one or more mutants:
1) 1-1 to 1. One design error is correlated to one EFSM
fault, which is implemented by a single mutant.
2) n-1 to n. Multiple design errors are correlated to
the same EFSM fault, which is implemented by
multiple mutants.
3) n-n to 1. Different design errors are correlated to
different EFSM faults, which are implemented by
the same mutant.
The first category is the most straightforward, since
there is a unique association between a design error, its
corresponding EFSM fault and the mutant implementing
such a fault. For example, design error 1 in Table 2 falls
within this scenario. It is associated with EFSM fault 7(a),
which is responsible for altering the destination state of
the transition incoming to state A. This EFSM fault is
implemented by one mutant that executes such a state
alteration in the code.
The second category involves design errors that are
correlated to the same fault, because they share the EFSM
element they operate on (e.g., the same update or en-
abling function), but it is not possible to implement one
mutant for all design errors. As an example, the design
Design Description Class EFSM Cat.error fault
1 Forgetting to call #2 6a
DS
the primitive
2 Calling nb transport fw() #4 6cinstead of b transport()
3
Calling the non-blocking
#4,#6 6bprimitive with a
misuse of polling
4 Misuse of polling #6 6d
5 Forgetting to wait #4 6f EFfor call completion
6 Forgetting to handle return
#5 6j UFA
from the primitive call
7-13
Wrong handling of the
response status returned
by the primitive call
14 Primitive call in dead code #1 6e EF
15 Wrong command #3
6h UFB
(command field)
16 Wrong address (address field)
17
Forgetting to set the
data pointer (data
pointer field = NULL)
18
Corrupted data pointer
(data pointer field modified
so that corrupted data
are read when accessed)
19 Wrong data length(data length field)
20 Wrong streaming width(streaming width field)
21
Forgetting to set the byte
enable pointer (byte
enable pointer field = NULL)
22
Corrupted byte enable
pointer (byte enable pointer
field modified so that
corrupted data are read
when accessed)
23 Wrong byte enable length(byte enable length field)
24 Wrong primitive parameter #2 6i UFI(payload pointer)
TABLE 2
Design errors in the initiator code for the b transport()
primitive and correlation with EFSM faults.
errors 2.7-2.13 correspond to an improper handling of the
response status returned by the primitive call. They are
all correlated to the EFSM fault 7(j), which operates on
the update function that models the initiator code after
the primitive call has completed. However, a different
mutant for each design error is needed to properly im-
plement every possible alteration to the response status.
The third category is the most interesting, since it
allows a reduction of mutants. Design errors 2.2 and
2.5 are correlated with different EFSM faults, 7(c) and
7(f) respectively, and they are implemented by the same
mutant. In fact, two different misconceptions in the
design process end up producing the same code. In this
case, this means invoking the nb transport fw() primitive
instead of the b transport() primitive.
Design errors 2.15-2.23 and 3.2-3.10 have the same be-
havior. They represent alterations to the correct values of
payload fields. For example, errors 2.15 and 3.2 represent
a wrong value in the command field. The first set of errors
is correlated with the EFSM fault 7(h), while the second
is correlated with the EFSM fault 7(i). This is reasonable,
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Design Description Class EFSM Cat.error fault
1 Misuse of wait() #1 6g EFin the primitive body
2 Wrong command use #3
6i UFI
(command field)




Forgetting to set back
the data pointer (data




modified so that corrupted
data are read when accessed)
6 Wrong data length use(data length field)
7 Wrong streaming width use(streaming width field)
8
Forgetting to set back the
byte enable pointer (byte
enable pointer field = NULL)
9
Corrupted byte enable pointer
(byte enable pointer field
modified so that corrupted data
are read when accessed)
10 Wrong byte enable length use(byte enable length field)
11-18 Wrong response status(response status field)
TABLE 3
Design errors in the target for b transport() primitive and
correlation with EFSM faults.
since the two sets belong to two different communication
sides, i.e. initiator and target. Nevertheless, in the code,
the alteration of a payload field is achieved by the same
mutant, regardless of whether the initiator or the target
performed it. For this reason, each error in the first
set and its corresponding error in the second set are
implemented by the same mutant.
The use of the EFSM models plays a fundamental role
in such a reduction, since it allows to group together
design errors sharing the same target and to observe
where their effects would be located within the commu-
nication protocol. This is extremely useful for the mutant
implementation since, beside reducing their number, it
ensures that all the mutants being implemented are tied
to at least one possible design error. This prevents from
injecting mutants that turn out to be unnecessary, since
they do not map back to a design error and, thus, they
do not reflect a real error that may be introduced during
the development of TLM designs.
8 MUTANT INJECTION INTO TLM DESIGNS
The mutant injection into the the user design is automat-
ically performed by exploiting the library implemented
in the step before. Before simulation, by means of a code
parser tool, each occurrence of the original primitives in
the user design is renamed as golden primitive, and the
corresponding mutated primitive provided by the TLM
mutant library is inserted, as shown in Figure 8.
Each mutated primitive implements a set of mutants,
which represent the EFSM faults. The mutants represent
the EFSM faults by perturbing the simulation execution
(e.g., by replacing the primitive call by an empty code
Design Description Class EFSM Cat.error fault
1 Forgetting to call #2 7a
DS
the primitive
2 Calling b transport() #4 7ginstead of nb transport fw()
3 Misuse of polling #6 7b
4 Forgetting to set the protocol
#2
7f UFIphase (phase parameter)
5 Forgetting to handle return
7e UFAfrom the call to primitive
6-8 Wrong return handlingfrom the primitive call
9 Primitive call in dead code #1 7d EF
10 Wrong command #3
7f UFB
(command field)
11 Wrong address (address field)
#5
12
Forgetting to set the
data pointer (data
pointer field = NULL)
13
Corrupted data pointer
(data pointer field modified
so that corrupted data
is read when accessed)
14 Wrong data length(data length field)
15 Wrong streaming width(streaming width field)
16
Forgetting to set the byte
enable pointer (byte
enable pointer field = NULL)
17
Corrupted byte enable pointer
(byte enable pointer field
modified so that corrupted
data are read when accessed)
18 Wrong byte enable length(byte enable length field)
19-23 Wrong primitive
#2 7g UFIparameter (phase)
24 Wrong primitive parameter(payload pointer)
TABLE 4
Design errors in the initiator for nb transport fw() primitive and









































Fig. 8. Mutant injection of primitive nb_transport_fw().
for implementing the fault of Figure 6(a)) or changing
the payload fields.
All mutants are enumerated. At run time, one mu-
tant at a time is activated through the MUT_number
variable, thus employing a mechanism based on mutant
schemata [43]. If the primitive contains the activated
mutant, the primitive switches to the corresponding
mutated behavior. Otherwise, the primitive simulates in
the fault free mode through the golden primitive. Each
mutant may simultaneously simulate more than one
design error, according to the mapping identified in the
previous sections. In this way, all possible design errors
can be tested with a reduced set of mutants.
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Design Description Class EFSM Cat.error fault
1 Misuse of wait() in #1 7c DSthe primitive body
2 Wrong command use #3
7g UFI
(command field)
3 Wrong address use (address field)
#5
4
Forgetting to set back
the data pointer (data
pointer field = NULL)
5
Corrupted data pointer
(data pointer field modified
so that corrupted data
are read when accessed)
6 Wrong data length(data length field)
7 Wrong streaming width(streaming width field)
8
Forgetting to set back the
byte enable pointer (byte
enable pointer field = NULL)
9
Corrupted byte enable pointer
(byte enable pointer field
modified so that corrupted
data are read when accessed)
10 Wrong byte enable length(byte enable length field)
11-15 Wrong protocol phase #2(phase parameter)
16 Wrong response status #5(response status field)
17-20 Wrong return value #2
TABLE 5
Design errors in the target for the nb transport fw() primitive
and correlation with EFSM faults.
Finally, mutation analysis reports a coverage measure
(i.e., mutation score) that expresses the quality of the
TLM design testbench to find all possible design errors
(as explained in Section 3.2). In particular, the analysis
indicates which classes of design errors are not covered
by the testbench and where such errors could be located
in the TLM design (e.g., during the payload setting in
the initiator, in the primitive call, etc.) thus allowing
designers to better improve the testbench structure.
9 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed methodology has been applied for quali-
fying the testbenches of the following benchmarks:
• the design examples released with the OSCI TLM-
2.0 library [5];
• an Error Correction Code (ECC) module in both
versions LT and AT [37], provided by STMicroelec-
tronics;
• the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) module of the
Magali platform [38] in LT version, provided by
STMicroelectronics and CEA-LETI.
The TLM mutant library has been implemented and
includes the mutated version of all the primitives of
the standard OSCI TLM2.0 library. The mutant library
has been applied for the testbench qualification of all
benchmarks. A SystemC framework has been developed
to perform mutation analysis, by using the testbenches
provided with the benchmarks. Each benchmark is stim-
ulated through a single testbench. It is worth noting
that such testbenches have been modeled by people
unaware of our mutation model. The framework works
according to the single mutation assumption. That is,
during simulation, one single mutant is activated at a
time. Then the output result is compared with the one
obtained through a simulation with no mutants activated
(i.e., through all the golden primitives, as explained in
Section 8). If the output result differs, the framework
reports that the activated mutant has been detected. The
output result depends on the benchmark. In the case of
the TLM examples, the output result consists of the print
statements on the standard output as a simulation trace.
In the case of ECC and FFT, the output results consists
of the output produced by the design functionality, in
addition to the aforementioned print statements making
up the simulation trace. We used the MuffinTLM tool
of the HIFSuite framework [44] for the mutant injection
phase and adopted the simulation kernel provided by
the standard SystemC 2.2 release.
In this section, we refer to an applied design error as an
error for which a corresponding mutant implementing it
has been injected in the design. Then, we refer to a de-
tected design error as an error for which a corresponding
mutant implementing it has been injected in the design
and killed by the testbench during simulation.
We also refer to mutations on enabling/update func-
tion or on destination state as mutants implementing
EFSM faults belonging to the corresponding category
(i.e., faults on destination state, on enabling function, on
update function before, in and after the primitive call).
Tables 6 and 7 report the experimental results.
Table 6 focusses on mutants. Column P reports the
number of TLM transport primitive invocations in the
design. Column LoC indicates the size of the TLM de-
scription in terms of lines of code. Columns App and
Det list the number of applied and detected mutants,
respectively. Column Cov reports the coverage in terms
of percentage of killed mutants. Column T reports the
total simulation time in seconds.
Table 7 shows the results from the point of view
of detected design errors. Columns A and D show re-
spectively the number of applied and detected design
errors for each category of the corresponding EFSM
fault, according to the classification of Section 5 and to
the correlation identified in Section 7.1. Column Total
summarizes the total number of design errors considered
and the coverage in terms of percentage of detected
design errors. Column Coverage (%) reports the mutation
score for each class of design errors according to the error
classification of Section 6.
By comparing Table 6 and Table 7, it is evident that
coverage in terms of detected mutants is lower than
coverage in terms of detected design errors for each
design. The reason for this behavior is that the same
mutant may implement more than one design error, as
pointed out in Section 7.2.
The achieved mutation coverage proves that test-
benches released with the examples are not accurate
enough to detect some possible design errors in the com-
munication protocol. The results show that mutations
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that alter the destination state or modify the enabling
function of a transition are quite easy to detect. They lead
to observable situations during simulation (i.e., infinite
loops, deadlocks or abrupt terminations) especially for
those implementing design errors belonging to classes
#1 and #6 for protocols based on both blocking (i.e.,
LT) and non-blocking primitives (i.e., AT). Design errors
belonging to classes #2 and #4 are more difficult to
be detected in case of non-blocking (multiphase) and
blocking primitives, respectively.
In contrast, mutations on update functions before the
primitive calls are much more difficult to detect, in
particular those that set some specific payload fields
(classes #3 and #5). This is due to the fact that not every
payload field is used in each transaction (e.g., the fields
related to the byte enable pointer are employed in a limited
number of circumstances). A modification to one of those
values does not produce visible effects on the output if
they are not used, and, as a consequence, the testbench
is unable to detect the corresponding mutant. Designers
are allowed to improve the testbench if necessary or to
consider such errors as redundant after a more detailed
analysis of the design.
On the other hand, the results show that mutation de-
tection heavily relies on the testbench quality in case of:
mutations on update function in and after the primitive
calls (classes #2, #4, and #5), mutations that alter the
primitive body (classes #2, #3, and #5) and mutations
that handle the return values of the primitive calls
(classes #2 and #5). If the testbench checks the returned
values after each primitive call and is able to handle
anomalies or error messages, the probability of detect-
ing these mutants is drastically improved. For several
benchmarks, the corresponding testbenches fail to cover
such mutations. Even if many of such errors are not
often recurring, high-quality testbenches should detect
them to avoid error conditions in the communication
phases. Even if the coverage is quite low by itself, it
should be noted that the importance of an undetected
mutant depends on the design itself, according to the
TLM protocol being implemented for communication
purposes. The reason for this lies in that the TLM-2.0
standard provides a number of payload fields which
are not strictly required, i.e. they can be optionally set
according to the communication protocol to be modeled
in the TLM description. As such, an undetected mutant
on a field not used in the communication protocol is def-
initely not as negative as an undetected mutant causing
a missing primitive or a deadlock, for instance.
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article presented a testbench qualification method-
ology for SystemC TLM protocols through mutation
analysis. The article showed how the methodology has
been defined for (i) qualifying the testbenches by con-
sidering both the TLM protocol correctness and their
compliance to a defined standard, (ii) optimizing the
simulation time during mutation analysis by avoiding
mutation redundancies, and (iii) helping designers in the
Design P LoC App Det Cov T (s)
OSCI LT 3 821 138 101 73.2 3.6
OSCI LT DMI 2 1058 92 58 63.0 3.5
OSCI LT 4 1065 184 114 62.0 5.6temporal decoupling
OSCI AT 1 phase 1 1514 49 26 53.1 2.3
OSCI AT 2 phase 2 1572 98 49 50.0 4.7
OSCI AT 4 phase 4 1727 196 96 49.0 12.9
ECC LT 5 667 230 126 54.8 2.5
ECC AT 2 727 98 36 36.7 1.1
FFT LT 1 4885 46 28 60.9 3.4
TABLE 6
Experimental results: Detected mutants.
testbench improvement. The experimental results con-
firmed the methodology effectiveness by highlighting,
for example, the inability of the testbenches provided
with the benchmarks in covering all features of the
adopted communication protocols.
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